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Abstract: Because the conflicts that led to the American Revolution mainly arose from 
constitutional issues, the history of these conflicts offers lessons for the design of the new 
European Union constitution. One lesson is the importance of avoiding needless conflicts 
between federal and member-state governments. In particular, forcing decisions on where 
sovereignty lies may cause great conflict. Another lesson is that a federal system depends on 
good will among the federal and member-state governments, and because this good will is easily 
dissipated, efforts should be made to nurture it. Federal exercise of power will often alienate 
member states; thus, a sensible strategy is to grant the federal government only the minimal 
powers that a strong consensus agrees it must have, and to change these powers only by strong 
consensus. Removing “democratic deficits” may not be sufficient in many cases to give 
legitimacy to exercise of federal power; minorities may require protection by constitutional 
limits on federal powers. 
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Self-Denial in Federalizing Power in the European Union: 
Lessons from the Causes of the American Revolution 
 
“The power of parliament is uncontrollable, but by themselves, and we must 
obey. They only can repeal their own Acts.”  
 
James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and 
Proved [1664] 
 
  
“[H]is Majesty’s Subjects in these Colonies, owe the same Allegiance to the 
Crown of Great-Britain, that is owing from his Subjects born within the Realm, 
and all due Subordination to that August Body the Parliament of Great-Britain.” 
   
Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress [1665]  
 
 
“Open your breast, Sire, to liberal and expanded thought. Let not the name of 
George the third be a blot in the page of history …. Only aim to do you duty, and 
mankind will give you credit where you fail. No longer persevere in sacrificing 
the rights of one part of the empire to the inordinate desires of another: but deal 
out to all equal and impartial right.”  
 
Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America [1774] 
 
 
“That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent 
States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all 
political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to 
be, totally dissolved.” 
 
Richard Henry Lee, Motion at the Second Continental 
Congress, seconded by John Adams [June 7, 1776] 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 The European Union is considering a constitution. From published drafts, such a 
constitution appears likely to envision a federal union that is republican in nature: Sovereign 
power is divided between the federal government and the member states, and all member states 
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are either republics or constitutional monarchies. Many argue this type of federal union is suited 
to the European Union.1 An analogous committee wrote the U.S. constitution in 1787 for a 
federal union among sovereign, republican states. Some members of the U.S. constitutional 
convention thought it important to draw lessons from history for the constitution they were 
designing, in particular, the history of federations and republics (Madison 1920, Miller 1992). 
They found that ancient, medieval and early-modern European federations showed an almost 
unrelieved record of failure, and that the record of republics was little better. Some members of 
the Constitutional Convention thought it vital to try to learn from past failures and avoid their 
causes.   
 This paper examines some parts of United States history from the 1750s through the 
1780s to draw lessons for a possible European Union constitution. A substantial part of the 
discussion focuses on the causes that led to the American Revolution and the collapse of the first 
British Empire. For many Europeans, the “Revolution” calls to mind the French Revolution, not 
the American Revolution, and Europeans are often unfamiliar with important aspects of the 
American Revolution—and so are many Americans. Nevertheless, the American Revolution and 
its causes offer some lessons for designing an EU constitution.   
By the beginning of the Revolutionary War, many Americans had come to think of the 
British Empire as a federation in which elected American colonial legislatures had sovereign 
power over many issues. The British government, in contrast, asserted that Parliament had 
supreme power in all parts of the Empire; colonial legislatures had no powers of their own, but 
only those powers that Parliament might freely and temporarily grant them. From this point of 
view, the political struggles that led to the American Revolution may be thought of as revealing 
                                                
1 There is a substantial literature in political science and economics on the criteria for deciding the optimal degree of 
federalism. (Wildavsky, 1997). Wildavsky contrasts the unitary system, which he labels the coordination-coercion 
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some of the strains inherent in a federal system in which some member states come to disagree 
strongly with the federal government about what the division of sovereignty between the federal 
and member-state governments is or, at least, ought to be. The U.S. constitution embodied some 
lessons from this history of conflict. Similarly, this paper draws some lessons for a European 
Union constitution.    
 One conclusion is that the British Empire’s success depended in substantial part on the 
mutual goodwill between Britain and her American colonies. Goodwill is fragile, however, and 
requires cultivation from both sides. Quarrels over federal power—that is, Parliament’s power—
virtually destroyed this goodwill in the course of only ten years, from 1763. By 1773, relations 
teetered on a knife’s edge. Revolutionary War violence began in 1775, and the American 
colonies declared independence in 1776. The main British army in America was forced to 
surrender in 1781, and peace with independence followed in the Treaty of Paris, 1783. 
 Another conclusion is that disputes over where power lies on particular issues—with the 
federal or with the member-state governments—are often better allowed to lie dormant. When 
such disputes are dormant, facing and resolving them may lead to complicated, costly struggles 
that do more harm than good and are thus better avoided. The issues of principle between the 
British government and the colonies did not have to be raised; the issues were raised only 
because the British government insisted on demanding acceptance of its views of the principles 
involved, and many Americans refused to give up their conflicting principles.   
 One cause of the American Revolution was the determination of the British government 
to impose taxes for revenue purposes on the colonies, though this had never been done during 
more than 150 years of British colonial history in North America (the first Virginia Charter dates 
to 1606). The British government asserted nonetheless that Parliament had the right to do so. The 
                                                                                                                                                         
system, with the federal system, which he labels the competition-consensus system.  
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British legal system was, and is, one of common law. A principle in common law is that laws 
that are not enforced for long periods of time become invalid. One might argue that a right that 
the federal government does not enforce over long periods becomes invalid, especially if the 
federal government goes for long periods without clearly asserting the right. Similarly, rights that 
member states exercise without interference over long periods might be viewed as rights that the 
federal government has ceded and cannot take back. In any case, conflicts are sure to arise if the 
federal government asserts rights that it has not previously exercised and that some member 
states strongly object to or even deny the federal government has.  
 One reason put forward for a European Union constitution is to increase the legitimacy of 
EU-level decisions by remedying the so-called “democratic deficit.” Early in the struggles that 
led to the Revolution, many American colonists denied that Parliament had the right to impose 
taxes on them because Americans were not represented in Parliament—a type of democratic 
deficit captured by their slogan “No taxation without representation.” Over the course of a 
decade from 1763, however, American views evolved to the point that many Americans denied 
that Parliament had the right to legislate for them at all even if Americans sat in Parliament. 
Indeed, by 1765, only two years into the ideological struggle, some Americans asserted that they 
could not be taxed by Parliament without representation there and that they did not want to be 
represented in Parliament, because it was “impractical” (Stamp Tax Congress, 1765).  It is 
possible to imagine cases where a substantial number of EU member states may disagree with 
the right of the European Parliament to pass certain laws even though the states are represented 
in the European Parliament. Similarly, regulations by the European Commission or treaties by 
the European Council of Nations may be viewed as illegitimate by substantial numbers of EU 
citizens. In a federal system, it is naïve to think that representation of all member states at the 
  Essay 2. p. 5 
 
federal level is sufficient to lend legitimacy to all federal policies. One strategy to protect 
legitimacy is for a constitution to put explicit limits on federal powers to reduce the possibility of 
conflicts between the federal and member-state governments.    
 As the colonies and Britain moved closer to war, many Americans came to argue that 
only the British monarch, and not Parliament, had powers over the colonies, and that these royal 
powers were substantially restricted by the founding charters the monarch had granted the 
colonies, and by rights granted by colonial legislatures under these charters. On the one hand, the 
British government viewed this as a weak, indeed meaningless, federal system. On the other 
hand, it was the strongest federal system that many Americans were now willing to accept. If a 
federal system is to make sense to the member states, a core set of powers has to be granted to 
the federal government in order for the federal government to accomplish the purposes that the 
member states have in mind in forming the federation. Americans and the British government 
can be thought of as having profound disagreements on this core set of powers possessed by 
Parliament. This suggests that a federation is more likely to prosper and indeed to survive if there 
is agreement on this core from the beginning, and if these core powers can be changed only with 
a strong consensus among member states. Further, even powers that are initially agreed on can 
lead to conflict between the federal and member-state governments—the federal government 
may interpret and use the constitution in ways the member-states deny are valid. Thus, the 
federation is more likely to survive and prosper if federal powers are explicit and are limited to 
those that are widely viewed as essential.    
2. Causes of the American Revolution 
 As with many important historical events, there is dis agreement over the causes of the 
American Revolution. Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that struggles over the right 
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of the British Parliament to levy taxes on colonists in America played a major role in the political 
conflicts starting in 1763 that led to armed conflict in 1775 and the Declaration of Independence 
in 1776. Successive British governments became more insistent on the hard-line position that 
Parliament was wholly unrestricted regarding the laws it could pass affecting American colonists 
and eo facto could levy taxes for revenues on them, including internal taxes, just as it could levy 
taxes in England. Early in the debates, many American politicians adopted the view that only an 
individual colony’s elected General Assembly could levy taxes on the colony. The hard-line 
British government position held that the British Empire was unitary, not federal; that parliament 
had supreme legislative power throughout the empire; and that colonial assemblies had no 
powers save those that Parliament might freely and temporarily delegate. The American position 
came to be that, first, Parliament was not superior to the charters of the individual colonies, at 
least not in all matters, and second and more generally, Parliament had limited powers over 
Americans, because Americans had no representation in Parliament. By the early 1770s, many 
Americans’ views had evolved to the position that Parliament had no legitimate powers over 
Americans; further, many Americans did not want representation in Parliament that might serve 
to justify Parliament’s claims to power over them.     
 Evolution of American Views. It is worthwhile following the evolution of American 
views. In the peace treaty that ended the Seven Years War (1756-1763, known in America as the 
French and Indian War), France ceded to Britain its holdings in Canada and its claims in the 
Mississippi Valley, save for the Louisiana Territory and New Orleans.2 The British government 
decided that holding these vast, new territories, from the Mississippi River east to the Allegheny 
Mountains, would require a standing army of regular British soldiers, mainly stationed beyond 
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the Alleghenies but with garrisons, supply depots, transit and transfer points, etc., in the thirteen 
colonies. The war had left Britain with a huge national debt. Partly because many in Britain 
thought the war had been fought to an important extent to protect Americans and American 
interests, and partly because the new army would provide the colonists with some protection 
against Indian attacks, the government decided that the American colonies should help pay for 
this army and its needs. For this purpose, the British government proposed in 1763 and 
Parliament passed in April, 1764, the Revenue Act, thereafter known as the Sugar Act. As part of 
the Sugar Act, the British government warned the colonies that it would soon pass the Stamp 
Act, also designed to raise revenues by requiring stamps on mail but also on legal documents, 
including all court papers, on ships’ papers, even on dice and playing cards. The British 
government recognized that the revenues that could be expected from these acts would at best be 
a small fraction, no more than 20 percent, of the funds required to support the regular British 
troops in British America.     
 While the British government was considering the Sugar Act, agents representing the 
thirteen colonies in London, and the colonies’ governors, made clear to government ministers in 
meetings and to Parliament in speeches3 that Americans would be prepared to resist enforced 
collection of the sugar tax.  
 The Sugar Act marked an important change in Britain’s extensive and long-standing 
system of mercantilist regulations (known as the Acts of Trade and Navigation, or the 
Navigation Acts) on the imports and exports of its colonies, including the thirteen American 
                                                                                                                                                         
2 In the peace settlement, France transferred the Louisiana Territory, west of the Mississippi, and New Orleans to 
Spain. France’s ally Spain ceded the Floridas to Britain for the return of Havana, which Britain had captured 
(Tuchman 1988).  
3 Some colonies’ agents were Members of Parliament and could thus raise colonial issues on the floor. Agents who 
were not MPs were sometimes prevented by technical maneuvers from presenting petitions to Parliament or 
testifying before its committees (Tuchman 1984).    
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colonies. Until the Sugar Act, the colonists had acquiesced in this mercantile system. Part of the 
British mercantile system was that Americans were to import only from Britain or her colonies.4 
The New England colonies imported a good deal of molasses from the West Indies, which was 
then distilled into rum and used in further trade, including the slave trade and ivory trade with 
West Africa; the New England colonies used this trade to finance their consistent balance of 
trade deficit with Britain. Under this mercantilist system, the New Englanders were supposed to 
buy molasses from the British sugar islands in the West Indies, not the French. The Americans 
traded extensively with the French sugar islands, however. To curtail this trade and protect their 
own interests, planters from the British sugar islands, some of whom were absentee-owners and 
powerful British politicians, succeeded in 1733 in having Parliament pass a tariff of six pence 
(6d) per gallon on non-British molasses, designed to be prohibitive and thus enforce the 
mercantile system. The tariff was rarely paid; the Americans smuggled extensively instead, and 
in some cases bribed customs officials. Indeed, the Americans evaded a fair amount of the 
mercantile regulations. Smuggling was a common, traditional British activity. Both in Britain 
itself and in the thirteen colonies, smuggling was carried out on a large scale, by some of the 
“best” families, and often with the connivance of government officials. For several decades, the 
British government essentially ignored American smuggling. Ignoring this smuggling was an 
important part of the “salutary neglect” of the American colonies, the policy followed by the 
Walpole government in particular and Whig Ascendancy governments in general. The Sugar Act 
of 1764 was passed by a Parliament that did not view the neglect as salutary, however, and a 
major purpose of the act was to change this neglect. On the one hand, the duty was lowered to 
3d; on the other hand, the government made clear that it intended this duty to be collected. 
                                                
4 Further, the colonies were to export goods only through British ports, and carried only in British bottoms. Thus, 
Virginia tobacco was shipped to England in English bottoms, and was then resold from there to say France and other 
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Further, unlike the previous duty that was designed for mercantilist purposes but was only 
haphazardly collected, the act explicitly said the new duty was designed for the purpose of 
raising revenue.5  
 The colonists were displeased by the Sugar Act and threatened by the Stamp Act. In part, 
the colonists simply disliked paying taxes. In part, there was some fear and much argument that 
the duty would destroy trade and impoverish much of New England, and thus indirectly harm 
sales of British manufactures to the colonies and damage the mother country. This was the 
practical argument against the Sugar Act (and to a lesser extent against the Stamp Act). The 
ideological justification for opposing the taxes came to have two parts. First, each colony was 
governed under its own charter, issued by the British monarch, and spelling out to some extent 
governmental structures and the rights and obligations of the colonies and colonists; many 
Americans viewed their charters as not giving Parliament the right to levy internal taxes on them, 
or to use tariffs (external taxes) for the purpose of raising revenue. Second, many argued that 
their rights as Englishmen were being violated because taxes were levied on them by a 
Parliament in which they were not represented.6  
 The colonists were long used to only modest supervision from Britain. 7 Further, during 
the long period of modest supervision, the colonists had developed their own set of documents 
                                                                                                                                                         
continental countries.  
5 In addition, the Sugar Act offended the colonists by removing trials of alleged violators from local common-law 
courts or local Vice-Admiralty courts in each of the 13 colonies to a special non-jury Admiralty court in distant 
Halifax, Nova Scotia (Tuchman, 1984, p. 146).  
6 Agents of the colonies in London discussed with the First Minister an alternative to the Stamp Act in which the 
colonies would tax themselves to pay for the new army. The First Minister did not pursue this.     
7 “Because of English preoccupation with internal political disorder from 1640 to 1688, and then with French 
competition from 1700 to 1760, the colonists were left with a surprisingly high level of political independence” 
(Lutz 1997, p. 55).   
     This is not to say that colonists had developed a greater ideological aversion to government intervention in the 
economy than had residents of Great Britain. At the time of the constitution, individual states’ governments 
intervened extensively in the economy, and it was largely taken for granted that state government had a large role to 
play in a state’s economic development. The question was rather the extent of the role of the federal government in 
such activity. Some argue that the U.S. constitution of 1787 was far from being designed to facilitate capitalism 
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and procedures that granted them rights that they did not view as concessions from Parliament. 
Rather, they viewed their rights as depending on the charters the monarch had granted the 
colonies, and on rights they argued they found in Natural Law.8 As Lutz (1997, p. 60) says, 
“Basically, American notions of rights developed from their own experience as colonists…” 
These American rights were substantially stronger and broader than rights in England.9 One 
example is freedom of worship. “The right of the individual to worship freely was not achieved 
in Great Britain until 1829 and 1832 for Catholics and Dissenters, and not until 1846 for Jews.” 
(Schwarner 1997, p. 15).  
 Further, Parliament tightened up on customs by sending new agents with more powers 
and stronger incentives. In particular, the customs agents, and the British naval officers who 
helped them, got shares of prize money for cargoes and ships that were confiscated. Though the 
Sugar Act was the occasion for tightening up, the agents could arrest and seize for any violations 
of the Navigation Acts, including harmless or relatively minor violations that were traditionally 
overlooked. Indeed, many colonists in coastal areas thought the customs agents were abusing 
their powers for their own benefits.   
 Reaction to the Stamp Act. The British government proposed, and Parliament passed, the 
Stamp Act in 1765 (on the Stamp Act Crisis, see in particular Morgan and Morgan, 3rd ed., 
1995). The colonies reacted strongly. One part of the reaction was an America-wide movement 
to force the resignation of the agents who were to sell the required stamps. When the Stamp Act 
took effect in November, 1765, all agents then in the colonies had been coerced into resigning, 
                                                                                                                                                         
(McDonald 1984). Instead, the role of the federal government in economic activity was set by the evolution of 
policies under the first several administrations, in particular Hamilton’s federal system (McDonald 1982, Brookhiser 
1999), and the opposition to it by Jefferson and Gallatin (Balinsky 1958).  
8 “In addition to writing what amounted to functional constitutions between 1620 and 1775, the colonists also wrote 
many bills of rights…” (Lutz 1997, p. 60).                        
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sometimes with violence, though with no loss of life. Another part of the reaction was the Stamp 
Act Congress in New York City, in October, 1765; the nine colonies in attendance sent a petition 
to Parliament for repeal of the Stamp Act. Importantly, this Congress flatly denied any 
distinction between acceptable external taxes on trade and unacceptable internal taxation; they 
objected to all taxes for revenue. 10 Indeed, the New York Assembly had made the same point in 
1764 (Morgan 1992, p. 18-19).11  
 British governments were committed to the view that as a result of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 and the Settlement of 1688-1689, Parliament had supreme power (see the 
appendix, “Influences on the Founders and Framers’). The monarch retained much power, but in 
any showdown between Parliament and the monarch, Parliament was sup erior. Further, 
Parliament was essentially unrestricted in its legislative and executive powers; Parliament could 
                                                                                                                                                         
9 “A confluence of circumstances led Americans to require, develop, and expect a set of rights not found in England, 
and this set of rights was characterized by a breadth, detail, equality, fairness and effectiveness in limiting all 
branches of government that distinguished it from [British] common law.” (Lutz 1997, p. 62).  
10 British opponents to the Americans long continued to assert that the Americans were willing to accept external 
taxes but not internal taxes, thus increasing miscommunication.  
     Among the thirteen declarations the Congress adopted were:   
III. That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubted right of Englishmen, that 
no taxes be imposed on them, but with their own consent, given personally or by their representatives. IV. 
That the people of these colonies are not, and from their local circumstances cannot be, represented in the 
House of Commons in Great-Britain. V. That the only representatives of the people of these colonies, are 
persons chosen therein by themselves, and that no taxes ever have been, or can be constitutionally imposed 
on them, but by their respective legislatures. VI. That all supplies to the Crown, being free gifts of the 
people, it is unreasonable and inconsistent with the principles and spirit of the British Constitution, for the 
people of Great-Britain to grant to His Majesty the property of the colonists…. (Resolutions of the Stamp 
Act Congress, 1765, italics added). 
11 Morgan (1992, pp. 18-19) writes that the New Yorkers asserted,  
all Impositions, whether they be for internal Taxes, or Duties paid, for what we consume, equally diminish 
the Estates upon which they are charged  …. The whole Wealth of a Country may be as effectually drawn 
off, by the Exaction of Duties, as by any other Tax upon their Estates.  
Morgan (1992) traces the common British view, that Americans opposed internal taxes but would accept external 
taxes for revenue, to Benjamin Franklin’s influential testimony before Parliament in 1766, where he seemed to 
support this view, as part of the attempt to repeal the Stamp Act. Parliament later turned against Franklin. He was 
hauled before a committee of Parliament and subjected to mockery and abuse, called a traitor and a thief. In 1778, 
Franklin wore the same suit as he at that appearance for the signing of the treaty of alliance with France (Tuchman 
1984; see also Bailyn 2003).  
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do anything that was constitutional, and in the end Parliament decided what was constitutional. 12 
Many British politicians argued that Parliament held power over all British subjects, not only in 
Britain, but in Ireland, in the American colonies, etc. Parliament might forgo exercising some 
powers or delegate them, but in principle it retained them all. 13  
American resistance, in the form of “Non-Importation” of goods from Britain, 
accompanied by protests and pressures in Britain from manufacturers and workers (Draper 
1996), led the government to propose repeal of the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act. Repeal in 1766 
was linked, however, with the Declaratory Act. This act asserted that, despite repeal, Parliament 
had supreme power over the American colonies in all matters, “it could bind them in all cases 
whatsoever”—by implication including internal and external taxation for revenue purposes. 
Americans were satisfied by repeal, and seemed to take the Declaratory Act as a face-saving 
measure on the part of the British government.14  
At this point, many Americans argued that Parliament had no right to tax them, either 
through internal taxes like the stamp tax, or through external taxes like the sugar tax. But, they 
acknowledged, Parliament had the right to regulate trade throughout the British Empire, for the 
good of the whole empire, including the right to use tariffs for this purpose. In this view, 
Parliament had the right to legislate, but not the right to tax. Many British writers argued that 
distinguishing between tariffs for regulating trade and for revenue made little sense. This was a 
                                                
12 The English Bill of Rights (1689) guaranteed certain rights to individuals, but Parliament retained the power to 
decide what these guarantees meant. At the Pennsylvania ratification convention for the Constitution, on Nov. 24, 
1787, James Wilson argued, “The British Constitution is just what the British Parliament pleases.” (Quoted in 
Schwarner 1997, p. 36.) The English Bill of Rights (1689) is substantially narrower and less complete than the 
American Bill of Rights (1792) in important ways (Lutz 1997). 
     Commentators divide on the importance of the Bill of Rights in American history, and the intellectual merits of 
the Federalist and anti-Federalist arguments regarding the need for a Bill of Rights (Levy 1992; McDonald 1997).  
13 McDonald (1982, p. 30) writes, “In practice the empire had functioned as a federal system, but the concept of 
federalism had not been developed, and thus thinking in terms of it was impossible for disputants on both sides.” 
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good debating point, but a counterproductive political position; many Americans eventually 
came to the position of denying that Parliament had the right to legislate for them at all.  
 Soon the British government had another run at extracting tax revenues from the 
Americans, with the Revenue Acts or Townshend Acts.15, 16 Import tariffs were to be paid by 
Americans, at low rates, on a small, targeted list of goods—glass, paint, lead, paper, and the most 
prominent, tea of all grades. The Townshend Duties were passed in May 1667.17 These were 
tariffs—imposts on external trade—and were not taxes on internal trade. This distinction did not 
matter to the colonists, however, because it was explicit that the tariffs were for revenue 
purposes; the Stamp Act Congress of October, 1765, as well as pamphlet writers in 1764, 1765 
and 1767, had made clear that taxes for revenues were the issue, not whether the taxes were 
external or internal. (For pamphlets, see Otis 1764, Dulany 1765 and Dickinson 1767; for 
discussions of them, see Morgan and Morgan 1995, Bailyn 1965, 1967 and Draper 1996.) 
Once again, the British government was forced to retreat in the face of general Non-
Importation of British goods and some mob violence; New York voted for Non-Importation in 
                                                                                                                                                         
14 Some argued that the Declaratory Act did not explicitly mention taxation, and thus taxation was not included in 
“all cases.” Thomas Paine (1776) later used the quote, “it could bind them in all cases whatsoever,” against the 
British with devastating effect; see below.  
15 Tensions were increased in the meantime by the Quartering Act of 1766, which required colonies to provide funds 
and goods for British regular troops stationed in or passing through the colonies. These requisitions were viewed as 
a type of tax, and thus opposed by many. New York’s general assembly refused to provide the demanded funds. In 
response, Parliament passed the New York Suspending Act, which made all acts of the assembly null and void until 
the assembly voted the funds. New York backed down, and voted the funds, but many Americans were angered.     
16 Parliament also stirred resentment in America by passing the North America Act, which dealt with issues raised 
by territories Britain acquired from France in the settlement of the Seven Years War. First, the British government 
prohibited Americans from settling west of the Allegheny Mountains. The purpose was to reduce conflicts with 
Indians in these territories. The colonists viewed this as shutting off settlement on attractive land to which they had 
claims under colonial charters. Second, the government enacted toleration of the Catholic religion in Canada and in 
these territories [claimed by the Americans] in order better to deal wi th the French Catholic residents. Some 
Americans, however, took this as a threat that the government would impose Catholic rights in the 13 colonies. 
Third, the government made provision for non-jury trials in Canada in some circumstances. Non-jury trials were the 
general rule under French law, and hence congenial to French Canadians. Americans, however, viewed the right to a 
jury trial in both criminal and civil cases as an important guarantee against government oppression, and viewed the 
British laws for Canada as a possible harbinger of changes in laws for Americans.     
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1768, and other colonies followed during 1769. When the British government backed down this 
time, however, it insisted on maintaining one tax—the tax on tea—as a marker for its claimed 
right to legislate for the colonies on all matters. This right was a matter of principle to many in 
Parliament, and they determined to vindicate it in practice by the tax on tea. The colonists also 
began to see the conflict as a matter of principle. The amount of the tax, and its limitation to one 
good, were not the point; this was a matter of principle. A number of American politicians 
claimed that if the British government were to ask for funds from the colonies to support the 
army, the General Assemblies would be forthcoming in voting funds—but Americans were 
going to tax themselves, as a matter of principle.  
The colonies maintained Non-Importation of all British goods over the remaining tax on 
tea, but as time went on the level of imports revived somewhat. In 1772, New York officially 
abandoned Non-Importation, and other colonies followed. On the one hand, it appeared to the 
British government that the colonies had acquiesced in the tea tax, and thus in taxation for 
revenue. On the other hand, the colonies in major part evaded the tax by smuggling in Dutch tea, 
though the British East India Company was the only legal source under Britain’s mercantilist 
laws. As a result, sales of East India Company tea to the colonies fell by almost two-thirds. This 
decline in sales contributed to the severe economic difficulties then afflicting the East India 
Company, difficulties which greatly concerned the British government.  
The Role of Miscommunication. The British government proposed a tax of 3d per pound 
on tea, but also proposed that the East India Company could sell directly to America, rather than 
going through England and paying taxes there. On balance, this would reduce the price of tea to 
Americans from 20d per pound to only 10d, including the 3d tariff, and was designed to 
                                                                                                                                                         
17 Townshend essentially succeeded in imposing his tariffs-for-revenues views on the weak government in which he 
served; some members of the government would have preferred not to rile the Americans. Having made this 
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stimulate the Company’s tea sales in America. The East India Company was to deliver its tea to 
licensed agents in the colonies, who would accept it, pay the tariff on it, and distribute it to 
American retailers. The British government was surprised when the Tea Act aroused great 
protests. The tea smugglers, of course, and the sailors, shipyards and other support industries 
were displeased on economic grounds, as were the American tea wholesalers who would be cut 
out by Company agents selling directly to retailers in America. 18 Others focused on the principle 
that Parliament said it was asserting, Parliament’s right to tax Americans. The Company’s agents 
in the colonies were mostly frightened into resigning, reminiscent of the Stamp Tax agents. Two 
sons of the British-appointed governor of Massachusetts did not resign, however, and seemed 
prepared to land tea and pay the tax on it, thus breaking non-importation of tea.    
 Matters reached a crisis with the Boston Tea Party. A number of colonists took over ships 
in Boston harbor that were carrying tea, and threw the tea into the harbor, thus forestalling its 
landing, acceptance by the governor’s sons, and payment of tax by the agents, and sales to 
American retailers. The British regular troops stationed in Boston did nothing; their commander 
felt they were too few to act. After news reached London, the British government responded with 
the Coercive Acts or Punitive Acts (called the Intolerable Acts in the colonies). The Acts closed 
Boston to trade until the owners of the tea were compensated and provisions were made to 
prevent future such actions. Further, among other punishments, Parliament drastically and 
unilaterally modified Massachusetts’s charter, taking away many rights Massachusetts citizens 
had long enjoyed. The colonies responded once again by attempting to prevent imports of British 
goods, particularly tea. The embargo was imperfectly effective, but effective to an extent that 
                                                                                                                                                         
contribution to discord, Charles Townshend died of “fever” in September, 1767, at age 42. 
18 Many noted that this would give the Company a monopoly on tea, which it might later exploit. Further, the 
Company, which was unpopular, might use this monopoly on tea as the start of monopolies in other goods. Some 
viewed the Company as thoroughly corrupt and in league with a corrupt British government.   
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surprised the British government. This time, however, the colonists had lost much sympathy in 
Britain by destroying private property—the tea that had been thrown into Boston harbor—and 
the Coercive Acts had passed easily. Parliament was not going to back down.  
 Nor were the colonies going to back down. The first Continental Congress, including 
representatives from all colonies save Georgia, met in 1774 in Philadelphia to coordinate 
resistance. The Congress protested strongly to Parliament, and declared that the Coercive Acts 
were unconstitutional and invalid. Congress further advised citizens to arm and to form militias 
for their defense if attacked (Tuchman 1984, p. 201).                  
 Violence was a frequent part of the struggles between the British authorities in America 
and the colonists.19 The homes of a number of British officeholders or supporters were 
destroyed, particularly in Boston (Draper 1996) during the Stamp Act Crisis. Threats were 
widespread; some government supporters were roughed-up, though there were no deaths. Much 
resistance was non-violent, however; in particular, many Americans relied on boycotting British 
goods and British government agencies. Many colonial juries refused to convict Americans 
whom the British charged. Eventually, few Americans would serve on juries, either from 
principle or out of fear, and in Massachusetts the court system ground to a halt after the 
Intolerable Acts.  
 Throughout the colonies, militias began to drill and were expanded. Many speeches and 
pamphlets urged the colonists to be prepared to defend themselves militarily. At this point, many 
Americans had come to believe that Parliament had no right to make any laws concerning 
                                                
19 Mob violence was surprisingly common in the colonies, by twenty-first century standards. This trait may have 
come with the colonists from England, where mob violence was important in the seventeenth, eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  Violent London mobs were important in the Commonwealth period, and large, widespread, 
violent protests over a tax on cider in England caused George III to dismiss the Earl of Bute as first minister.  
(Tuchman 1984, Kishlansky 1996.) One version of why the Duke of Wellington was called “The Iron Duke” relates 
it to the fact that he had iron shutters on his London townhouse to protect it from stone-throwing mobs when he was 
first minister.  
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Americans, including mercantilist laws. At most, many argued, Americans and Great Britain had 
the same king in common, but were otherwise wholly separate. George III and many British 
politicians thought that the only choice was to acknowledge full independence of America, or to 
use military force to make the colonies to submit. On April 18, 1775, British regulars sent to 
seize weapons and ammunition at the towns of Lexington and Concord, outside of Boston, 
engaged American militia, with many dead and wounded on both sides. Later in the year, at the 
Battle of Bunker Hill, American militia killed many British regulars. War was inevitable. 
The Continental Congress issued the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 (Maier 
1999). The war went badly for the Americans, but they won a major victory over British regulars 
at Saratoga, New York, in 1777. This victory helped convince the French to sign an alliance with 
the United States in 1778. Hostilities were active until Cornwallis surrendered on October 19, 
1781, at Yorktown, Virginia, where he was besieged on land by American and French troops, 
blockaded at sea by a French fleet, and pounded by artillery. Peace was agreed in the Treaty of 
Paris in November, 1782, to take effect in January, 1783.  
Concepts of Liberty. The conflict between Parliament and the Americans arose in large 
part because of substantive disagreements over the extent of Parliament’s power. The conflict 
was exacerbated both by the evolution in the Americans’ position over time, but also because of 
confusion over what each side meant by the words both were using. A key example is the word 
“liberty.” Isaiah Berlin (2002) discusses two concepts of liberty. In the first, liberty consists of 
the individual’s right to have a say in what government does, in particular, what the government 
does to the individual. In the second, liberty consists of the individual’s right to areas of private 
activity where the government has no say, or a limited say, in what the individual does. (The first 
is often called positive liberty, in the sense of allowing the individual to act, the second is 
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negative liberty, in the sense that some things cannot be done to the individual.) In 1763, 
Americans objected to taxes levied by Parliament, by appealing to the first concept—Americans 
were not represented in Parliament; thus, established, acknowledged British-American liberties 
protected Americans from taxation by Parliament. By the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, its 
members were rejecting representation in Parliament as “impracticable.” Under the implications 
of the first concept of liberty, the Stamp Act Congress thus asserted that Americans could not be 
taxed as a practical matter by Parliament. In his Draft Instructions (1774) to the Virginia 
delegation to the (first) Continental Congress, or Summary View of Rights in British America , he 
appealed to the second concept of liberty: Parliament had no rights to interfere with Americans. 
To be sure, in Jefferson’s analysis, an individual American colony could tax its residents through 
its elected colonial legislature, but this was under the first concept of liberty, for Americans were 
represented in their legislatures.    
The British Parliament claimed that, in principle, Americans had no rights to areas of 
private activity in which Parliament had no say, or only limited say. Instead, in the “Declaratory 
Act” of 1766, it claimed Parliament could “bind them in all things whatsoever.” Parliament 
aimed in this declaration to assert its right to tax Americans, but the literal assertion made was 
stronger than taxation, far stronger. Nevertheless, it reflected Parliament’s view that it could 
legislate whatever was constitutional, and that Parliament ultimately decided what was 
constitutional. To be sure, Britons—and Americans—thought they had liberties, areas where 
government had no say or only limited say. On the one hand, Parliament was the defender of 
these liberties. On the other hand, Parliament was ultimately the entity that decided what these 
liberties were. There was no appeal of Parliament’s definitions and decisions. The only legal 
recourse was for voters to change Parliament’s members in the hopes of changing its decisions 
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on liberties. Thus, British and American liberties in the second concept were contingent on, and 
could only be defended by, liberty in the first concept.  
The American colonists at first ignored the Declaratory Act, as simply words to save 
Parliament’s face while Parliament backed down over the Sugar and Stamp Acts. In a few years, 
tensions were much greater and goodwill was drastically depleted, and some viewed 
Parliament’s assertion in a more sinister light. Tom Paine (1776) argued,  
Britain, with an army to enforce her tyranny, has declared that she has a right (not only to 
TAX) but “to BIND us in ALL CASES WHATSOEVER,” and if being bound in that 
manner, is not slavery, then is there not such a thing as slavery upon earth.  
 
Indeed, it was common for colonial leaders to assert that Parliament’s goal was to enslave 
Americans. George Washington, neither hot-headed nor hyperbolic, spoke of enslavement, as did 
Adams, Jefferson, Madison and many more.20  
Americans conceded powers to their colonial governments that they would not concede 
to Parliament. Indeed, by 1774, Jefferson stated that Parliament had no powers over American, 
appealing implicitly to the second concept of liberty. At the same time, Americans conceded 
only limited powers to colonial legislatures, again under the second concept of liberty. Each 
colony’s legislature was limited by the colony’s charter and by other rights and privileges that 
                                                
20 Jefferson’s Draft Instructions for the delegates from Virginia to the (first) Continental Congress, 1774, asserted 
that Britain’s oppressive acts “pursued unalterably through every change of ministers … plainly prove a deliberate 
and systematical plan of reducing us to slavery.” Washington saw “a regular systematic plan [to] fix the shackles of 
slavery upon us.” Bailyn (1967, p. 120); see Tuchman (1984, p. 200).  Bailyn (1967, pp. 232-233) writes:   
“ Those who are taxed without their own consent expressed by themselves of their representatives,” John 
Dickinson [a prominent pamphleteer] wrote “are slaves. We are taxed without our consent expressed by 
ourselves or our representatives. We are therefore—SLAVES.” Yes, Josiah Quincy concluded…, “I speak 
it with grief—I speak it with anguish—Britons are our oppressors: I speak it with shame—I speak it with 
indignation—we are slaves”—“the most abject sort of slaves,” said John Adams. … “The subjects of 
governments under the absolute and arbitrary direction of one man,” [a] newspaper writer of 1747 
commented, “are all slaves, for he that is obliged to act or not to act according to the arbitrary will and 
pleasure of a governor, or his director, is as much a slave as he who is obliged to act or not according to the 
arbitrary will and pleasure of a master or his overseer…”    
    Samuel Johnson mocked American slaveholders who yelped the loudest about liberty (Draper 1996). Edmund 
Burke spoke in Parliament about the sincerity of American views on liberty, whether held by slaveholders or non-
slaveholders.  
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colonists had won over time, all based on documents that were viewed as contracts. In the view 
of Jefferson and many others, the king had monarchical rights, but could exercise them only with 
the agreement of the separate legislatures, which were bound by written restrictions. The 
Americans, then, insisted on both forms of liberty. Representative government ensured the 
individual had a say in what the government did. Government limited by a written constitution 
that enumerated its powers, with the rest of powers restricted to the states or the people, ensured 
that there existed areas of private activity where the federal government had no or limited say.       
3. Possible Lessons for a European Union Constitution   
 Of course the thirteen American colonies and their relationships to Great Britain are very 
different from the fifteen European Union countries and their relationships with the Commission, 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Many of the particular issues and 
institutions involved in the run-up to the American Revolution have little direct relationship to 
European Union issues. Nevertheless, American history offers some useful insights for designing 
a constitution for the European Union.  
 First, goodwill among the federal and member-state governments is necessary to make a 
federal system work, and goodwill is fragile. It can be dissipated through conflicts that are 
avoidable and over issues that in substance are minor. In 1763, the American colonists had a 
strong sense of goodwill towards the mother country. Most were proud to call themselves 
Englishmen, and were proud of the rights they enjoyed as Englishmen. For the loyalty of British-
Americans, Britain had a hold that America could not rival. On the contrary, citizens of a given 
colony thought of themselves as Virginians or Pennsylvanians, not as Americans. At all times, 
the amount of money at stake in the various tax bills Parliament passed was small in practical 
terms. Both sides, however, made the struggles into ones of principle. By 1775, many American 
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politicians, and not just the radicals, were convinced that the British government was acting in a 
conscious plan to enslave Americans. Thus was goodwill quickly and completely dissipated.  
 Second, in the early part of the struggles, a major issue was a “democratic deficit,” 
though no one used that modern phrase. Parliament could not tax Americans, claimed the 
colonists, because Americans were not represented in Parliament. Only after the war was in its 
third year did important British politicians seriously consider offering Americans seats in 
Parliament. Over the decade 1763-1773, many Americans came to reject the idea that if they had 
seats in Parliament, then Parliament would enjoy the unlimited rights over them that many 
British politicians asserted; they did not want to solve the problems between them and Britain by 
being represented in Parliament. This led some British politicians to charge the Americans with 
bad faith: On the one hand, they could not be taxed because they were not represented in 
Parliament; on the other hand they did not want to be represented in Parliament. Another way of 
looking at this, though, is that the Americans came to think they were part of a federal system, 
not a unitary empire, and on reflection, were unwilling to give up to Parliament some of the 
rights they claimed, even if they were represented in Parliament.  
 The analogy to the EU is that representation in the European Parliament may not be 
sufficient to make citizens of at least some member states acquiesce in EU decisions. At some 
point in the future, some member states may come to feel that the EU has evolved in directions 
that were largely unforeseen, and that they never agreed to what is then being asserted as the 
rights of EU institutions over them.  
Another conclusion is that disputes over where power lies, at the federal level or with the 
member states, should often be allowed to lie dormant. Facing and resolving such disputes when 
they are dormant may lead to complicated, costly struggles that are well avoided.  
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 One cause of the American Revolution was the determination of the British government 
to impose taxes for revenues on the colonies, though this had never been done during more than 
150 years of colonial history. The British government asserted nonetheless that Parliament had 
the right to do so. A principle in common law is that laws that are not enforced for long periods 
of time become invalid. One might think that a right that the federal government asserts but does 
not enforce over long periods becomes invalid. Similarly, rights that member states exercise 
without interference over long periods might be viewed as rights that the federal government 
cannot take away. It is clear that if the federal government asserts rights not previously 
exercised, rights that some member states deny the federal government has, the scene is set for 
dangerous conflicts.  
 Stepping back, in designing a constitution it may be wise consciously to aim at avoiding 
sources of constitutional conflict. In 1763, it was not clear which side was in the constitutional 
right, the colonies or Parliament; circumstances and institutions had changed greatly in England 
between the dates when most of the 13 colonies were founded and when Parliament passed the 
Sugar and Stamp Acts. An analogy for the EU is later interpretations that might be put on powers 
a constitution grants to the federal level. Member states may argue that they never understood the 
constitution to grant the federal government powers it now claims.  
 An example is a common defense policy. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress sole 
power to declare war and to finance war, and makes the president the commander in chief. It is 
clear that acting jointly, Congress and the president can take over state militias and commit them 
to wars that the individual states have not voted for and which many might oppose, perhaps by 
large and strong majorities in some states. The particulars of whether and when the president has 
to have Congress declare war before using the armed forces, the role of the states in training the 
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militias and in selecting officers, and many other important issues are unclear in the constitution, 
and some are still being worked out in practice. The fact that the federal government can commit 
state militias to war is perfectly clear, however, and was perfectly clear, to the special ratifying 
conventions in each state that considered the Constitution. War is capable of placing maximum 
strain on a federation. Indeed, the U.S. has sometimes felt great internal strains from unpopular 
wars. The states were clear, however, when they ratified the Constitution that they were giving 
war powers to the federal government.   
 This suggests that whatever powers a new EU constitution might grant a EU federal 
government, it will be wise to make federal war powers as clear and explicit as possible. The 
member states should know what they are agreeing on to the maximum possible extent.  
 All constitutions necessarily contain ambiguities, and this includes constitutions of 
federations. Under all constitutions, then, conflicts arise over what powers government has, and 
in a federal system, a major source of conflict is how government powers are distributed across 
federal and member-state governments. All federal systems must have some mechanisms —
formal or informal, legal or political—for resolving disputes about division of power between 
federal and member-state governments. Such constitutional conflicts can have grave 
consequences for the stability and functioning of the federal system.  
 No constitution can envisage all the possible questions that might arise about use of force 
by the federal government. It seems inevitable there will eventually arise cases in which the 
federal government and some member-state governments disagree on the use of force, with 
disagreement strong enough to become a constitutional issue and precipitate a constitutional 
crisis. Any well-designed constitution will contain provisions for resolving such constitutional 
issues and, it is hoped, defusing constitutional crises. The mechanisms that the constitution 
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provides may, however, be inadequate. In the U.S. today, the big majority of the people agree 
that the Supreme Court decides in the end what the law is—and that is that (until, possibly, a 
later Supreme Court reverses itself). This was hardly the case for the first 100 years of the U.S. 
There was great debate and conflict over who decided what was constitutional, with a large body 
of respectable thought supporting the view that the member states had a role in interpreting the 
federal constitution. Thus, in many important cases, the Supreme Court decided one way, but the 
states or the federal government defied its rulings.  
 In the years before the American Revolution, Parliament came to view itself as the 
supreme interpreter of what was constitutional. The American colonies disagreed with 
Parliament on the constitutionality of a number of measures that affected America, and the 
colonies were unwilling to let Parliament decide on the measures’ constitutionality. Similarly, in 
potential disputes between an EU federal government and member states, it is not clear that 
member states will uniformly acquiesce in the EU’s mechanism for resolving constitutional 
crises and accept the legitimacy of decisions on constitutional issues.  
 Related, member states may feel so strongly on some issues that they will not accept the 
political outcome of constitutional rulings. In ordinary circumstances, the member states might 
acquiesce in the decisions of legitimate interpreters of the constitution—win some, lose some. 
Some issues may seem so important to member states that the interpreters of the constitution lose 
their legitimacy in virtue of their decision. The member states may in such circumstances decide 
that the constitution has been overthrown by illegitimate decisions, or may decide to leave the 
union.   
 The ability of a federal EU government to coerce member states into contributing money, 
support and armed forces for a conflict that some member states oppose is an obvious rock on 
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which an EU constitution may founder. One attempt to avoid this is to make clear in the 
constitution that the federal government has strong, unambiguous war powers that it can exercise 
no matter what the member states think. When the member states ratify the constitution, they 
agree to follow federal decisions. This approach is always subject to failure. If some member 
states are deeply opposed to a war, it is likely to be that they never envisaged war in such 
circumstances, and hence that they view the war as unconstitutional.  
 An alternative is to give member states strong opt-out rights from any war. Any federal 
EU war would then have to rely on a coalition of EU forces tailored for the particular 
circumstances. NATO, for example, allows for very substantial opt-out rights. Under Article 5, if 
a NATO member has been attacked and NATO agrees this has happened, all member countries 
must treat this as an attack on all. The member countries have great leeway in how they can 
respond to the attack, however. They have no obligation to contribute combat forces, for 
example.  
 Some envisage a Europe that is an economic superpower, a superpower in foreign affairs, 
and a superpower in defense—or war. The EU is of course an economic superpower already. It is 
true that if the EU were to speak with one voice on foreign policy, it would have more weight in 
world affairs. The difficulty now is to get the EU member states to agree on a single policy. An 
EU constitution might vest foreign policy at the federal level, allowing the EU to speak with one 
voice even if there is bitter dissent among the member states. To the extent that a unified foreign 
policy did not impose positive actions on member states—for example, boycott Israel—or stifle 
free speech, a federal EU policy might generate strains that the Union could live with.  
 War is a different matter. A federal EU government with coercive power over member-
states’ resources, support and armed forces presupposes a great deal of unity among member-
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states’ views if policy is to be successful. With strongly felt disunity among some member-states, 
federal policy is less likely to be successful than with unity, and in the limit might lead to the 
collapse of the federal system.       
 The extent of federal war-making powers might be left implicit in an EU constitution, 
with the federal and member-state governments allowing the powers to become explicit and 
more far-reaching in an evolutionary way. In this approach, the federal government would be 
reluctant to use war-powers unless member states reach a strong consensus. It is possible that 
over time, member states would then begin to acquiesce in federal policies, and the federal 
government could use war powers even when there is less consensus among member states. Just 
as likely, however, is the possibility that member states will come to feel that there a federal 
common law that the federal government uses war powers only when there is strong consensus 
among member states. That is, putting off the issue of the extent of federal war powers and the 
ability of the federal government to coerce member states may lead not to organic agreement but 
instead to a tradition of disagreement.  
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Appendix to: 
 
Essay 2, “Self Denial in Federalizing Power in the European Union:  
Lessons from the Causes of the American Revolution” 
 
 
Timeline of Events in the American Revolution 
 
  
A large, often quickly-changing cast of characters played important roles in the events of 
the American Revolution. This appendix gives a timeline that shows some of the important names 
involved and the actions with which they were associated. It starts with the Whig Ascendancy, 
beginning with Robert Walpole in 1721, and ends with British recognition of American 
independence in the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Table 1 shows these men and events, as well as some 
publications that were important in the ideas of the American Revolution.  
 The great Whig leader Robert Walpole was first minister from 1721 to 1742. When 
Walpole was allowed to resign in 1742, after much jockeying among Whigs, his close collaborator 
Henry Pelham took over as first minister. Pelham’s brother, the Duke of Newcastle, continued to 
control the patronage operation as he had under Walpole. Pelham’s term ended with his death in 
1754, but Newcastle continued to serve in the government, often as first minister, and to control 
patronage until 1761, a run of forty years; his forte was power patronage and he left the governing 
to colleagues. During the Seven Years War (1756-1763), Newcastle was first minister;1 William 
Pitt, the elder, was Secretary of State and ran politics and particularly the war. Pitt made a success 
of the war, in contrast to earlier Nine Years War, War of the Spanish Succession and War of the 
Austrian Succession, which ended as draws at best. George II died in 1760 and George III 
succeeded him. In 1761, George III decided to take more control of policy and patronage, and in 
                                                
1 Newcastle was first minister at the start of the Seven Years War in 1756. Late that year, he was replaced with the 
Duke of Devonshire. By the middle of 1757, Newcastle was first minister, and Pitt was in charge of the war. 
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1762 dismissed Newcastle and the very popular Pitt. George replaced Newcastle as first minister 
with the Earl of Bute, a Tory and a father figure to George. Bute made so many mistakes, in 
particular, imposing a tax on hard cider in England that led to large, widespread and violent 
protests, that George let him go in 1763 (the year the peace treaty for the Seven Years War was 
signed).  
The period 1760-1770 saw unstable governments. The governments were largely 
dominated by Whigs, but the Whig factions fought viciously. For forty years, from 1721 to 1762, 
from Walpole to Newcastle and Pitt, Whig governments pursued a policy of “Salutary Neglect” 
towards the American colonies, but this was about to change. Other Whigs had other ideas. 
Enter three famous names in American history, George Grenville, Charles Townshend and 
Lord North. To replace Bute as first minister in 1763, George III chose Grenville, a Whig. 
Grenville was Pitt’s brother-in-law, but more importantly, had political links to the Duke of 
Bedford. Bedford served as Lord President of the Council in the Grenville government, and was 
its real head. The Bedford men generally took a hard line on the colonies and determined to 
exercise closer control over them. Between 1763 and 1765, the Grenville-Bedford government 
proposed the Sugar Act (1764) and the Stamp Act (1765) and Parliament passed them. The 
Americans protested these acts strongly. Meanwhile, out of anger over a perceived insult to his 
mother, George dismissed Grenville and his government in 1765. George replaced Grenville with 
a weak Whig government under the Marquess of Rockingham, who was more conciliatory to the 
Americans, and his government repealed the Sugar and Stamp Acts in response to pressure from 
the Americans and from British merchants. George then dismissed Rockingham in 1766 and 
brought in a new government. Pitt was lured out of retirement to run the government, but he was 
sick and spent little time in London and none in the Commons (having been made Lord Chatham). 
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Bedford men again dominated the government (Bedford did not hold office, but worked through 
his men in the cabinet), and again they took a hard line on America. The nominal first minister 
was Lord Grafton, a Tory, but he had little control and was often dominated by the Bedford men. 
Enter the second famous name in American history: A key Bedford man was Charles Townshend, 
a Whig and Chancellor of the Exchequer. He proposed the Townshend Duties on American 
imports, rammed them through a reluctant cabinet (some members were not Bedford men, some 
not even Whigs), and got overwhelming approval in Parliament. He then died young, and the Tory 
Lord North, a third famous name, took his place as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Pitt resigned in 
discuss and pique in 1768. After bungling personnel matters in the cabinet, Grafton resigned as 
first minister in 1770, and George replaced him with the reluctant Lord North, who served as first 
minister in a Tory government for the next twelve years.  
In reaction to protests and Non-importation by the Americans, Parliament repealed all of 
the Townshend Duties save that on tea. The Americans mostly avoided the duty, however, by 
smuggling much of their tea. In 1774, the North government decided to force the Americans to 
pay tax, through the Tea Act. The Americans’ response was angry and sometimes violent, 
including the Boston Tea Party. Parliament responded with the Intolerable Acts, which closed 
Boston to trade, and sent more regular troops to Boston. In 1775, British troops and American 
militia fought at Lexington and Concord, outside Boston, and later that year at Bunker Hill. In 
1776, Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence. The great American victory over the 
British at Saratoga, New York, in 1777, impressed the French enough to sign a treaty of alliance in 
1778. Combined American and French forcers surrounded Cornwallis at Yorktown and forced his 
surrender in 1781. In 1783, the British and Americans agreed to peace in the Treaty of Paris, 
which acknowledged American independence.    
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